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Objection 17 · The pleasure principle

Why would God make it feel good if it's wrong?

The objection, in full

The Catholic prohibitions on sex outside marriage, masturbation, contraception, and homosexual acts all run into the same wall: the activities in question are designed, by the same God who allegedly forbids them, to be intensely pleasurable. Either pleasure is a reliable signal that something is good — in which case the prohibitions are perverse — or pleasure is not a reliable signal, in which case God built a system designed to deceive us about our own good. Neither option flatters the believer.

If God didn't want us to enjoy it, he had a strange way of showing it.
— common formulation; cf. Bertrand Russell, Marriage and Morals

or, in plain terms —If God doesn't want me touching myself, why does it feel so good?

Thomas Aquinas
scholastic, the Five Ways
1225–1274

Pleasure follows the good. It does not define it.

The objection assumes that pleasure is the criterion of goodness — that if an act is pleasurable, it must be good, and any prohibition must be arbitrary. This is precisely backwards. In the order of nature, pleasure is attached to goods to draw us toward them. Eating is pleasurable because eating sustains life; sex is pleasurable because it generates and binds life. The pleasure is the lure; the good is what it lures us toward.

What follows is that pleasure is reliable when ordered to its proper end and unreliable when severed from it. The glutton experiences real pleasure in eating beyond his need; the pleasure is genuine, but it is no longer doing the work it was designed for. The same applies to the sexual faculty. Detached from the goods it exists to serve — the union of spouses, the begetting of children — the pleasure remains, but it has been cut loose from what made it good in the first place.

To say "it feels good, therefore it is good" is to mistake the signpost for the destination. A counterfeit coin still feels like money in the hand. The question is whether it spends.

Citations Summa Theologiae I-II.34 (on pleasure) · ST II-II.153–154 (on lust and its species) · ST I-II.31.7 ("Whether bodily pleasure is greater than spiritual?")
Ad maiorem Dei gloriam