Miracles don't happen.
The objection, in full
A miracle is by definition a violation of natural law. Our evidence for natural law is the uniform experience of every observer, ever. Our evidence for any specific miracle is at most a few testimonies, often centuries old, transmitted through religious communities motivated to preserve them. Bayesian arithmetic does the rest.
No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.
or, in plain terms —Nobody rises from the dead. Period.
Hume assumed his conclusion.
The argument: miracles are very improbable; testimony for miracles is more probably false than the miracle is true; therefore reject all miracle reports. But "miracles are very improbable" is a probability conditional on no God. The whole argument is conditional on the conclusion.
On the assumption that there is a God who acts in history, the prior on miracles in connection with that history is not vanishingly small. It is exactly what you'd expect.
The question therefore reduces to: is there a God? Hume hasn't shown there isn't. He has only shown that if there isn't, miracles don't happen.