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Objection 17 · The pleasure principle

Why would God make it feel good if it's wrong?

The objection, in full

The Catholic prohibitions on sex outside marriage, masturbation, contraception, and homosexual acts all run into the same wall: the activities in question are designed, by the same God who allegedly forbids them, to be intensely pleasurable. Either pleasure is a reliable signal that something is good — in which case the prohibitions are perverse — or pleasure is not a reliable signal, in which case God built a system designed to deceive us about our own good. Neither option flatters the believer.

If God didn't want us to enjoy it, he had a strange way of showing it.
— common formulation; cf. Bertrand Russell, Marriage and Morals

or, in plain terms —If God doesn't want me touching myself, why does it feel so good?

G.K. Chesterton
paradox, wit
1874–1936

The fence around the garden is the reason there is a garden.

The modern man looks at a fence and asks why it is there. If he is wise, he does not tear it down until he has found out. The Christian rules around sex look, from a sufficient distance, like fences around nothing — arbitrary lines drawn across an open field of pleasure. Walk closer and you find that the field is a garden, and the fence has been keeping the wolves out.

The argument from pleasure proves too much. If "it feels good, therefore it is good" were a moral principle, it would license every addiction and excuse every betrayal. The man cheating on his wife also reports that it feels good. The drunk reports the same. Of course it feels good. The question every grown person eventually has to answer is whether the things that feel good are also the things that build a life worth having ten years from now, and twenty, and at the deathbed.

Christianity's sexual ethic is unfashionable. It has always been unfashionable. It was unfashionable in pagan Rome, which is precisely why Christianity spread there — it offered, for the first time in that world, a vision in which women and slaves and unwanted children were not disposable. The hedonist objection sounds new. It is in fact the oldest objection there is, and the strangest fact in history is how many tired hedonists, having tried the alternative, have come back to the fence and looked again at the garden.

Citations The Thing (1929), ch. 4 ("The Drift from Domesticity") — the famous "fence" passage · What's Wrong with the World (1910), Part III · Orthodoxy (1908), ch. 7
Ad maiorem Dei gloriam